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PRIVATE SOLICITATIONS UNDER
THE WILLIAMS ACT
The legislative history of the Williams Act' indicates that ten-
der offers 2 do not include privately negotiated transactions. 3
Neither the Act nor its legislative history, however, defines the
terms "tender offer"4 and "privately negotiated transaction." Be-
cause acquiring companies often seek to bring their takeover at-
tempts within the private transaction exception,' the need for
standard definitions of both terms 6 is pressing.7
1 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-z(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). For a summary of the relevant provi-
sions of the Act, see notes 30-39 and accompanying text infra.
2 The Williams Act regulates "tender offer[s], or request[s] or invitation[s] for ten-
ders." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e) (1976). This Note will use the abbreviated phrase, "tender
offer."
A tender offer is an attempt to acquire controlling interest in a corporaton by paying
cash for shares. Other means of acquiring control include proxy contests, regulated by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1976), and offers to exchange
stock, regulated by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 99 77a-77aa (1976).
' See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hoover Co. v.
Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,
150 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,429 (D.D.C. 1978); S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua
Inv. Coop., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (D. Mass. 1978); Heine v. The Signal Companies,
Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,898, at 91,319-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. I11. 1973); Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475
and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968) (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. Hearings]; Full Disclosure of Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24, 36 (1967) (Statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen) [hereinafter cited as S.
Hearings]; id. at 123, 133 (statement of Prof. Stanley A. Kaplan); 113 CONG. REC. 856
(1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams). But see S. Hearings, supra, at 74 (statement
of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.) (Williams Act "appl[ies] in full to cash tender offers directed to
small groups of persons.").
' Although the Williams Act's legislative history discusses the characteristics of tender
offers, see notes 50-57 and accompanying text infra, Congress did not adopt a controlling
definition.
' See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (not a
privately negotiated transaction); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107 at 96,150 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979) (not a
privately negotiated transaction); cf. Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773,
789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (transaction solicited off exchange and then consummated on ex-
change floor not a tender offer).
6 Open market purchases also fall outside the "tender offer" definition. See, e.g., Ken-
necott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1206-07 (2d Cir. 1978); Chromalloy
Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116, 117-118 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment in Williams Act suit where evidence indicated
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Despite this need for uniform definitions on which offerors
can rely,8 however, courts have adopted divergent tests 9 for defin-
ing "tender offers." Some courts follow the "conventional" test
for tender offers. This test characterizes as a tender offer a solici-
tation at a fixed premium price and contingent on specified con-
ditions. 10 Other courts focus on pressure to make ill-considered
decisions to tender" in distinguishing tender offers from exemp-
ted solicitations. Still others apply Securities Exchange Commis-
open market purchases); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341,
1346-47 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction in Williams
Act suit where evidence indicated open market purchases); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities
Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (acquisition of "large amount of stock in
open market purchases" not tender offer); D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771, at 96,562 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("It seems clear ...
that open market purchases cannot be a 'tender offer' "). However, this Note focuses only
on private solicitations, and the problems that it addresses are remediable through either a
comprehensive definition of "tender offer," or a narrow definition of "privately negotiated
transaction." Although this Note analyzes the inadequacies of the definitions of both "ten-
der offer" and "privately negotiated transaction," see notes 50-105 and accompanying text
infra, it proposes a narrow definition of the private exemption exception alone. See notes
106-37 and accompanying text infra.
I Acquisition of an ongoing business is the least expensive way to enter a new market,
[1979] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 492, at A-14 (statement of Martin A. Siegel), and
purchasers can obtain working control of a company by acquiring the holdings of a few
institutional investors. See Block & Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEC.
REG. L.J. 133, 137-38 (1978). Such takeover attempts are more likely to succeed if they can
avoid the pre-disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, see notes 23-30 and accompany-
ing text infra, through the privately negotiated transaction exemption; pre-solicitation dis-
closure enables the target company to implement defensive tactics. See generally E. ARANOw,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENT IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
199-202 (1979). Because of the increasing opportunities for corporate takeovers due to the
concentration of securities in a few institutional investors, see Block & Schwarzfeld, supra at
137-38, courts must fashion carefully definitions for "tender offer" and "privately
negotiated transaction." Cf. Long, Pressure on Fiduciary Holders in Premium Cash Offers,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1979, at 5, 10 (presence of trustee-shareholders may
increase target company's vulnerability to tender offers at premium prices because of trus-
tees' fiduciary duties).
I See Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(criticizing SEC's test for tender offers because "so vague a test would introduce a crippling
uncertainty in an area in which practitioners should be entitled to be guided by reasonably
clear rules of the road.").
' Some courts offer no reasons for why a particular solicitation is a tender offer or an
exempt transaction. See, e.g., Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D.
Okla. 1972).
10 See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1978); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); notes
50-57 and accompanying text infra. The "conventional definition" may also include other
factors such as widespread solicitation. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
" See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.'REP.
(CCH) V 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1973); notes 64-68 and accompanying text infra.
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sion (SEC) guidelines 12 or analogize to the private offering excep-
tion 13 under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).' 4
These definitions of "tender offer" are unsatisfactory. Often
focusing on rigid and artificial criteria, 1 they fail to reflect all the
protective purposes 16 of the Williams Act and the economic jus-
tifications for the privately negotiated transaction exemption.' 7
Furthermore, current definitions are often vague.' 8
In order to effectuate congressional intent fully, courts
should not exempt a tender offer from the Williams Act unless it
meets three threshold requirements. Solicitees must have access to
relevant information, '" adequate time to make a well-considered
choice to tender,20 and sufficient sophistication to make an in-
formed decision. 2' If an offering satisfies these threshold
criteria, courts should weigh both the interests of the economy
and of the offeror in an exempt transaction against the interests
of the solicitees in the Act's fairness provisions and of the unso-
licited shareholders and investing public in advance disclosure.22
Such a test would accurately reflect congressional intent, be flexi-
ble enough to accommodate unique fact patterns, and yet also
permit prospective offerors to predict more accurately the legal
consequences of their conduct.
I
PURPOSES OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. Protection of Solicited and Tendering Shareholders
Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, solicitees of ten-
der offers typically lacked information about the offeror's identity,
12 See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hoover Co. v.
Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at
96,148 (N.D. Ohio 1979); notes 73-75 and accompanying text infra. But see Brascan Ltd. v.
Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (questioning both permissibility
and desirability of SEC test).
13 See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); notes 94-95
and accompanying text infra.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
15 See notes 59-63 and accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 72, 77-81, 96-101, and accompanying text infra.
17 See notes 71, 80, and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 76, 77, and accompanying text infra.
19 See notes 109-13 and accompanying text infra.
20 See notes 117-22 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 114-16 infra.
22 See notes 108, 124-27, and accompanying text infra.
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its means of financing the transaction, and its plans for the target
corporation.23 Many offerees who did receive information had
insufficient time to analyze it thoroughly before tendering.24 Pre-
mium prices, 25 coupled with short periods in which to tender or
with first-come-first-served purchase provisions, compelled hasty
choices. Furthermore, solicitees lacked time to consider counter-
arguments by incumbent management 26 and counter-proposals by
competing tender offerors.27 Thus, prior to the Act, offerees
were usually unable to decide rationally whether to tender. 28
The primary purpose of the Williams Act was to afford so-
licitees such a rational choice. 29 The statute thus requires disclo-
sure of material information about the offeror.30 The Act also
permits solicitees to withdraw tendered shares, 31 thereby enabling
them to evaluate information about the purchaser,32 competing
offers, and management's counter-arguments even after tender-
ing.
23 See H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11-12 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F.
Cohen); S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 17, 34 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Co-
hen); 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams).
2' H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11-12 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen);
S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 34 (statement of Chairman Manuel F. Cohen); 113 CONG. REC.
856 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams).
23 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams).
26 H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen);
S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 35 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
27 H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen); S.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 34 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
28 See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2812 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; SEN. REP. No. 550,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
29 H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen); S.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 33 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen) (Williams Act
"is designed ... to provide those who receive a tender offer with information adequate to
an informed decision whether of [sic] not to accept ... ").
30 The Act's pre-solicitation disclosure provisions apply only to tender offers that might
result in beneficial ownership of more than five percent of the outstanding securities of the
class solicited. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). Before soliciting, such a purchaser must dis-
close his identity, the source and amount of funds used in making the purchase, his plans
for the target corporation, the number of shares owned, and any arrangements, under-
standings, or contracts relating to the purchased securities. The SEC may require disclo-
sure of additional information. The purchaser must send this information to the issuer, the
SEC, and each exchange on which the security is traded. Id.
Subject to certain exceptions, see id. § 78m(d)(6)(A)-(D), persons acquiring more than
five percent of the outstanding securities of the solicited class must disclose information
similar to that required of a tender offeror. Id. § 78m(d)(1).
31 Subject to certain exceptions, see id. § 78n(d)(8), each tender offeree may withdraw
tendered securities during the first seven days following his tender or after the first 60
days of the offer. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
32 Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1980) (requiring all tender offers not made by the issuer
to remain open for 20 days).
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Congress also intended the Williams Act to insure fair treat-
ment33 of tendering solicitees.34 For example, Congress designed
the withdrawal provision to prevent an offeror from locking of-
ferees into irrevocable tenders at low prices and then tendering
those shares himself to a second tender offeror at a higher
price.3 5  Furthermore, a pro-rata take-up provision 36 insures that
the offerer will not secure early tenders, thereby tying up shares
for long periods, and later decide not to purchase any securities
of particular tendering shareholders. 37  Finally, a most-favored
offeree price provision 38 prevents discrimination against early
tender if the price is later increased to attract sufficient shares. 39
B. Protection of Unsolicited Shareholders and the Investing Public
Congress intended the Williams Act to benefit not only the
solicitees of tender offers, but also the unsolicited shareholders of
the target corporation and other public investors. 40  The Act re-
quires offerors to make available to all investors information that
"might substantially change the assumptions on which the market
'3 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (prohibiting fraud, deception, and manipulation in
tender offers).
11 H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen); S.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 33 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen); id. at 35
(statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen) ("The second objective of this bill is to
assure fair treatment of all shareholders who decide to accept a tender offer.").
3- S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 39 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
Congress also designed the withdrawal provision to prevent offerors from delaying exces-
sively before deciding whether to purchase tendered shares. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28,
at 10, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & At. NEws at 2820; SENATE REPORT, supra note
28, at 10; S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 38-39 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Co-
hen).
36 Subject to certain exceptions, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (1976), if the offeree tenders
during the first 10 days of the offer more securities than the offeror is willing to purchase,
the offeror must purchase those securities pro rata according to the number that each of-
feree tenders. Id. § 78n(d)(6). The pro rata take-up provisions also applies to all securities
tendered during the 10 days following any notice of an increase in the price that the
offeror is willing to pay. Id.
37 S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 36, 39 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
38 If the amount offered increases during the course of the tender offer, all offerees
must receive the highest price paid. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
39 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 11, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2811, 2821; SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 10.
" The Supreme Court has stated that "[t~he sole purpose of the Williams Act was the
protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer." Piper v. Chris-Craft In-
dus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (denying an unsuccessful tender offeror standing to sue
the target company for alleged Williams Act violations). Accord, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-60 (1975) (Williams Act's "principle object" is "to insure that public
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price [of the target company's stock] is based"' and that might
cause the stock's value to decline. Disclosure also renders the
market less susceptible to needless disruption because of leaks of
information and rumors.42
Congress also enacted the Williams Act to protect the
economic efficiency of tender offers. Congress recognized that
tender offers frequently benefit both the target company and the
economy by weeding out inefficient management. 43  Congress
therefore designed the Act to protect the investing public without
placing "undue obstacles in the way of honest and fairly con-
ducted transactions." 44
C. The Privately Negotiated Transaction Exemption
Although Senator Williams recognized that privately
negotiated transactions could create the same problems for so-
licitees and the investing public as could tender offers, 45 he be-
shareholders ... confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to
respond without adequate information ...."). See also Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (underlying purpose of Williams Act is protection of
investors through full disclosure by both offeror and incumbent management), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
Although the Piper Court's statement might refer only to solicited investors in the target
company, such an interpretation seems inaccurate. At least one court has read Piper as
"making a broad distinction between public investors who were the intended beneficiaries
of the Williams Act, and tender offeror contestants whom the Williams Act was designed to
regulate.... All shareholders of the target are within the class the Act was designed to
protect." Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Furthermore, if
the Court did interpret the Williams Act to protect only solicitees, its interpretation would
be inconsistent with its construction of the antifraud provisions in the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1976), which are similar to those in the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
See United States v. Naftalin, 99 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1979) ("[N]either this Court nor Con-
gress has ever suggested that investor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities Act
[of 1933].").
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 3. Senator Kuchel argued that both solicited
shareholders and the public are entitled to know the offeror's identity, financial commit-
ments, and plans for the target company. 113 CONG. REC. 24665 (1967).
42 S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 86 (statement of New York Stock Exchange President G.
Keith Funston) (one of the Act's three most important objectives).
4' HOUSE REPORT. supra note 28, at 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2813; SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 3.
41 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams). See also H.R.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 10 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen) (Act not
intended to encourage or discourage "planned acquisitions of large blocks of securities of
publicly-held companies, where control of the company may be at stake"); S. Hearings,
supra note 3, at 32 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
" "The essential problem in transfers of control resulting from cash tender offers or
open market or privately negotiated purchases is that persons seeking control in these ways
are able to operate in almost complete secrecy concerning their intentions, their commit-
366
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lieved that such transactions should be exempt from the Act be-
cause of the danger of "premature disclosure." 46  Pre-solicitation
disclosure may adversely affect business transactions in several
ways. For example, disclosure of the terms of one purchase might
injure both buyer and seller in future negotiations with others by
revealing how far each is willing to go to strike a bargain. Disclo-
sure of a purchaser's plans for corporate acquisitions might also
alert its competitors to its expansion plans, or create publicity that
might upset delicate negotiations. 47 Furthermore, disclosure of
the buyer's plans for the target company might encourage the
shareholder to take a tougher bargaining stance than he otherwise
would. 48
Good reasons also exist for exempting a limited solicitation of
a few large and sophisticated shareholders from the Act's fairness
provisions. 49  Because substantial, sophisticated investors will
likely have significant bargaining power with the purchaser, they
are unlikely to require the protection of the Williams Act's best
price, take-up, and withdrawal provisions.
ments and even their identities." 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen.
Williams).
" Id. at 856.
47 Cf. id. (pre-solicitation disclosure "upset[s] the free and open auction market where
buyer and seller normally do not disclose the extent of their interest ... ").
48 The reasons for exempting privately negotiated transactions from the Williams Act's
disclosure requirements ostensibly apply also to tender offers. For example, the tender of-
feror's future business negotiations suffer as much from pre-solicitation disclosure as do
those of a private offeror. However, the business disadvantages of disclosure for offerors
justify exempting only privately negotiated transactions (and also open market transac-
tions), see 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams), because in
these transactions offerees, other shareholders, and the general investing public do not
need the Act's protections. See notes 109-22 and accompanying text infra.
The interests of the general investing public and of the unsolicited shareholders in
advance disclosure, see notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra, also explain why the pri-
vate solicitation exemption does not apply automatically if the solicitees do not need the
Act's protections. Even if the solicitees have adequate information and can obtain equitable
terms, the solicitation should be exempt only if the public's and the unsolicited sharehold-
ers' interests are satisfied or outweighed. See notes 108, 126, 127, and accompanying text
infra. Thus, many of the rationales supporting the privately negotiated transaction exemp-
don, see notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra, represent interests of the offeror and
the economy that may outweigh the interests of public investors and unsolicited sharehold-
ers. See notes 108, 126, 127, and accompanying text infra.
49 See generally notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
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II
CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF "TENDER OFFER" AND
"PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED TRANSACTION"
A. The Conventional Definition of "Tender Offer"
Several courts look to the legislative history of the Williams
Act to define the "conventional" tender offer.50 According to the
committee reports, typical tender offerors bid to buy shares at a
premium price." The offeror usually agrees to purchase shares
only if specified conditions are met, 52 such as the tender of
enough shares to gain working control of the target corpora-
tion.5" The hearings and debates on the Act discuss other attri-
butes of tender offers, 54 including widespread solicitation 55 of
50 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206-07
(2d Cir. 1978) (no tender offer where most solicitations not made on the floors of stock
exchanges, but where almost all purchases consummated on exchanges and where off-
market purchases "largely [from] ... sophisticated institutional shareholders"); Smallwood
v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-99, 597 n.22 (5th Cir.) (take-over need not be
hostile to be a conventional tender offer), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Brascan Ltd. v.
Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no tender offer where pur-
chaser's broker scouted 30 to 50 "large institutional" shareholders and "about a dozen large
individual investors" out of 50,000 Brascan shareholders to provide sufficient stock for
purchase on open market); D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771, at 96,562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (no tender offer where offeror
solicited two dozen "sophisticated persons" by phone and purchased stock from four finan-
cial institutions); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 908 n.24 (N.D.
Me. 1971) (no tender offer where surviving corporation in corporate reorganization that
did not change central management solicited original corporation's shares); Water & Wall
Assocs. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC L. REP.
(CCH) 93,943, at 93,759 (D.N.J. 1973) (open market purchases not a tender offer); cf.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 821-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding tender offer
under conventional definition, but noting that "[w]hat is probably more important than ...
this transaction['s] traditional characteristics ... is that [it] ... was designed to ... transfer
controlling interest ... in a swift, masked maneuver.").
5' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2811; SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 2.
52 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2811; SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 2.
53 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams). A purchaser
may often obtain working control of a company by acquiring less than ten percent of the
target company's stock. H.R. REP. No. 1966, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5025, 5027-28; 111 CONG. REC. 28258 (1965) (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
" See H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11-14 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F.
Cohen); S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 87-88 (statement of New York Stock Exchange Presi-
dent G. Keith Funston); 113 CONG. REC. 855-56 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Wil-
liams).
" See H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 17, 33 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F.
Cohen); S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen);
113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams).
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shareholders by newspaper advertisements or press releases 56 and
holding of tendered shares in a depository or in the purchaser's
hands prior to acceptance. 57
The "conventional" description of a tender offer is unsatisfac-
tory 58 because it fails to promote the purposes of the Williams
Act.59 Congress intended the definition of tender offer to reflect
the purposes underlying the Williams Act; this intention is implicit
in the Act's authorization of the SEC to exempt from the disclo-
sure and fairness provisons "any offer for ... tenders ... not
comprehended within the purposes of [those provisions]." 60  The
conventional definition does not account for the Williams Act's
purposes, however. Rather, it focuses only upon objective criteria
when characterizing a transaction. Thus, slight deviation from
these criteria might exempt transactions contravening the Act's
56 Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 113
CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams).
57 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 n.22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); H.R. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen);
S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 33 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
Courts disagree on which of the typical attributes of tender offers discussed in the
legislative history are necessary for a tender offer. Some courts focus exclusively on the
committee reports and find that a bid, premium price, and offer contingent on specified
conditions are sufficient to violate the Act where a privately negotiated transaction is not
involved. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (2d
Cir. 1978); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp, 783, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (conventional
definition of tender offer not requiring publicity, widespread solicitation, or deposit of
shares). Other courts, however, also examine whether the offer involved widespread public
solicitation and deposit of shares. See Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp.
773, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,429 (D.D.C. 1978).
" See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,147 (N.D. Ohio 1979); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 1114, 1125 (D. Mass. 1978); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Note, The Developing
Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250,
1271 (1973). But see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195,
1206-07 (2d Cir. 1978); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
'9 See notes 23-49 and accompanying text supra.
60 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(c) (1976). Another indication that Congress intended defini-
tions of tender offer to effectuate the broad, remedial purposes of the Act is the Act's wide
scope; the Act regulates not only tender offers, but also requests or invitations for tenders.
Id. §§ 78n(d)(1), (5)-(7), (e). Construing "tender offer" broadly to implement the Williams
Act's purposes also comports with prior expansive construction of the securities laws. See,
e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1965); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d
709, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1971); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1969). But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
24-37 (1977) (tender offeror without standing to sue under Williams Act).
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purposes. 61 For example, solicitations to a small group without
widespread publicity may pose as much danger to uninformed
and unsolicited public investors as a "typical" tender offer, and
pressure to make ill-considered tenders may exist despite the ab-
sence of a premium price. 62 An adequate definition of tender
offer cannot consist merely of a potentially underinclusive
checklist of objective factors.63
B. Extending the Conventional Definition: The Impact Test
At least two courts have accepted a defintion of tender offer
that focuses on the impact of a transaction upon solicited
shareholders. 64  The "impact test" extends the definition of ten-
der offer "beyond its conventional meaning to offers likely to
pressure shareholders into making uninformed, ill-considered de-
cisions to sell" 65 and likely to have "the same impact as the con-
ventional tender offer." 66 Under this test, open market pur-
chases and transactions negotiated privately with a limited number
of major shareholders are exempt from the Williams Act.67  One
commentator has suggested that courts evaluate impact by looking
"only [to] objective elements involved in a transaction such as time
limits, premium prices, or specification of number of shares to be
bought." 68
61 Note, supra note 58, at 1271.
62 See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 820-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (most solicitees
asked to respond within one hour or less and "told that acceptances were coming in very
fast, inferring [sic] that the solicitee had better act quickly or be left out."); Hoover Co. v.
Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at
96,150 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (pressure by multiple press releases and letters); Nachman Corp.
v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,591
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (pressure by threats of loss of solicitee's directorship).
63 Cf. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding tender
offer under "conventional" definition, but noting that "[wihat is probably more important
than ... this transaction['s] [traditional] characteristics ... is that [it] ... is infected with the
basic evil which Congress sought to cure by enacting [the Williams Act]").
64 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-99 (5th Cir. 1974); Nachman
Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at
95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (dicta). See generally Note, supra note 58, at 1275-81 (proposing
impact test).
65 Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
66 Id.
67 Note, supra note 58, at 1276. "In negotiated purchases from a few, substantial
shareholders, pressure is ... absent since these shareholders have the leverage to obtain
the disclosure, time, and fair treatment necessary to make an informed, carefully consid-
ered decision on whether to sell their controlling interest." Id. at 1276 n.137.
68 Id. at 1278.
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Although the impact test goes beyond the conventional defi-
nition and properly considers pressure on solicitees, 69 it, too, is
inadequate. The test is both over inclusive 7 0 and underinclusive.
On the one hand, because it fails to account for the economic
reasons underlying the privately negotiated transaction exemp-
tion, 7 1 the test may impose the burdens of the Williams Act on
transactions better left unregulated. On the other hand, the test
does not promote the Act's purpose of protecting unsolicited
shareholders and the general investing public through advance
disclosure.7 2 The test may thus exempt from the Act's disclosure
requirements solicitations that do not pressure solicitees into ill-
considered choices, but that do decrease the value of unsolicited
shareholders' shares and of the future holdings of prospective
public investors.
C. The SEC Eight-Factor Test
The SEC has suggested an eight-factor definition 73 of tender
69 See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra. Although the impact test properly
evaluates pressure on solicitees, it fails to focus on two fundamental concerns of the Wil-
liams Act: disclosure of information and the need for statutorily-imposed fairness in a
transaction. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
70 D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94, 771, at 96,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (impact test "seems ... much too broad.") (dicta).
The court in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.
1978), also criticized the application of the impact test to open market transactions. The
court stated:
Although broad and remedial interpretations of the Act may create no prob-
lems insofar as the antifraud provisions ... are concerned, this may not be true
with regard to [the withdrawal, pro rata take-up, and most favored offeree
price provisions) .... It seems unlikely that Congress intended "tender offer" to
be so broadly interpreted as to make these provisions unworkable.
Id. at 1207.
"' See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
712 See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
" In March 1980, the SEC submitted to the Senate proposed amendments to the Wil-
liams Act that would replace "tender offer" with the concept of "statutory offer." See SEN-
ATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2d SESS., SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT ON TENDER OFFER LAws 89-90 (Comm. Print
1980). The proposed amendments to the Act's disclosure provisions define "statutory of-
fer" as
[a]n offer or offers to acquire securities ... described in section 13(d)(1) ...
made, directly or indirectly, by a person, other than the issuer thereof, if that
person is or upon consummation of such offer or offers could become the
beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of the class except that the term shall
not include:
... any offer to acquire the beneficial ownership of securities in a privately
negotiated transaction; provided, however, that no person shall acquire the bene-
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offers which at least two courts have applied.7 4 The SEC's
criteria for tender offers are: (1) active and widespread solicitation
of public shareholders; (2) solicitation of a substantial percentage
of issuer's stock; (3) premium price; (4) non-negotiable terms; (5)
offer contingent on the tender of a minimum number of shares
and, perhaps, on a maximum number to be purchased; (6) limited
time in which to tender; (7) pressure from the offeror to tender
stock; and (8) public announcements of the offeror's intention to
purchase the target company's shares preceding or accompanying
rapid accumulation of large amounts of target company sec-
urities. 5
The SEC's test is unsatisfactory principally because of its
vagueness. The test does not indicate which factors are essential to
a tender offer, or what weight courts should accord each crite-
rion.76  The inability of purchasers to predict whether a stock ac-
ficial ownership of securities in reliance upon this provision from more than 10
persons, directly or indirectly, in any period of 12 consecutive months. Id.
These propsals do not define "privately negotiated transaction." No bill incor-
porating the SEC's recommendations has been introduced in Congress.
Supp. 773, 790-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (criticizing SEC test because "some question whether it
[impermissibly] expands the scope" of Williams Act and because "so vague a test would
introduce a crippling uncertainty," yet applying test and finding no tender offer).
74 See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (alternative
holding) (SEC test "set[s] a tender offer apart from open market purchases, privately
negotiated transactions or other kinds of public solicitations."); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus.
Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 97, 107, at 96, 148-51 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (SEC test "conveniently separates the factors which enter into the determina-
tion whether an offer is a tender offer."). But see Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477
F. Supp. 773, 790-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (criticizing SEC test because "some question whether
it [impermissibly] expands the scope" of Williams Act and because "so vague a test would
introduce a crippling uncertainty," yet applying test and finding no tender offer).
" See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hoover Co. v.
Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at
96,148, 96,148 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
71 Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Despite the test's vagueness, courts agree that the importance of each factor varies with
the particular facts of the case at hand. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,148 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Furthermore, courts agree that solici-
ation of a substantial percentage of the target company's stock cannot alone distinguish a
tender offer from a privately negotiated transaction or other exempt purchase. See Brascan
Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wellman v. Dickinson,
475 F. Supp. at 824; Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,148. However, courts disagree on the importance of
publicity in the SEC test. Compare Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 825 ("Lack of
publicity ... should be no deterrent to classifying this transaction as an offer .. ") with
Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,107, at 96,148 (publicity "would seem to be highly relevant if there were public an-
nouncements of a purchasing program to be effected through open trading in a public
market.").
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quisition is subject to the Williams Act could have a chilling effect
on economically beneficial takeovers that Congress intended to
leave unregulated.7
The SEC's definition of tender offer also fails to incorporate
the purposes behind the Williams Act. Like the impact test, the
SEC's definition examines pressure on solicitees, yet ignores Con-
gress's intent to prevent discrimination among solicitees,7 8 to pro-
tect unsolicited shareholders and the public, 79 and to exempt
open market and privately negotiated transactions."0 Further-
more, the definition does not expressly require courts to investi-
gate the availability of information to solicitees, a central goal of
the Act.81
D. Analogy to the Private Offering Exemption Under the 1933 Act
In Wellman v. Dickinson,8 2 the court determined whether a so-
licitation met the privately negotiated transaction exemption by
analogizing 83 to the private offering exemption under the 1933
Despite the minimal importance that the Wellman Court accorded to publicity, publicity
can be an important reason for designating a transaction a tender offer. Publicity is a
telling sign of a tender offer when open-market purchases are involved. In S-G Securities,
Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978), the court held that "a
publicly announced intention ... to acquire a substantial block of ... stock ... for pur-
poses of acquiring control" followed by "rapid acquisition ... of large blocks of stock
through open market and privately negotiated purchases" is a tender offer.
Although the holding in S-G Securities may be limited to transactions involving pressure
in open market purchases, see 466 F. Supp. at 1126 (concern about pressure from publicity
on "public shareholders"), publicity may also be significant in finding private, off-market
purchases to be tender offers. First, publicity undercuts the offeror's argument that pre-
solicitation disclosure in private purchases may disrupt delicate negotiations, see note 47, and
second, publicity may place additional pressure on solicitees already contacted privately, see
Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,107, at 96,146 n.1, 96,147 n.5, 96,150 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (mail solicitation restricted by its
terms to Hoover family members "active and widespread" because of the "myriad public
announcements" accompanying the solicitation); preventing pressure to make ill-considered
tenders is a central purpose of the Williams Act. See notes 28-32 and accompanying textsupra.
7 [S]o vague a test would introduce a crippling uncertainty in an area in which
practitioners should be entitled to be guided by reasonably clear rules of the
road. The consequences of having purchased on the open market where a
court would later determine on the basis of so unpredictable a test that the
provision of [the Act] should have been respected could well be catastrophic
beyond reason.
Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
78 See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
79 See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
80 See notes 6, 46-49, and accompanying text supra.
81 See notes 19-32 and accompanying text supra.
82 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
83 Id. at 818-21. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 7, at 139 (courts and SEC consis-
tently, although implicitly, analogizing Williams Act exemption to private offering exemp-
tion under 1933 Act).
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Act.8 4  The 1933 Act prohibits the public offer or sale of unregis-
tered securities, 85 but exempts "transactions by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering." 86 Like the Williams Act, which does
not define "tender offer," the 1933 Act fails to define "public of-
fering." 87
The Supreme Court has held that availability of the private
offering exemption turns on "whether the particular class of per-
sons affected needs the protection of the Act." 88 Sophistication
of offerees does not by itself make an offering private.8" Each
offeree must either receive the information that a registration
statement would provide,9 0 or have access to such information be-
cause of a close relationship with the offeror. "  Factors relevant
in determining whether the exemption applies include the
84 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
'5 Id. § 77(e). A registration statement consists of two parts: (1) a prospectus distrib-
uted to each offeree, id. § 77e(b), containing specified information, id. § 77j(a)(1)(2); and
(2) information and exhibits available for public inspection in the SEC's files. Id. § 77f(a).
The latter information allows potential purchasers to verify the information in the prospec-
tus. Note, SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. and SEC Proposed Rule 146 as Attempt to Define a
Private Offering: The Insecure Exemption from Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 41
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 582, 592 n.80 (1973).
86 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
87 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953) ("The Securities Act
nowhere defines the scope of [the] private offering exemption.").
88 Id. at 125. Accord, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(analyzing availability of privately negotiated transaction exemption under Williams Act).
The offeror bears the burden of persuasion to show that the transaction is an exempt
private offering. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 1977);
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 819 (analyzing availability of privately negotiated
transaction exemption under Williams Act).
89 Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1977); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir. 1971); Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing availability of privately
negotiated transaction exemption under Williams Act). Sophistication of offerees may also
be unnecessary for a solicitation to qualify under the private offering exemption. Doran v.
Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d at 901 n.10.
'0 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt.
Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Tax Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 143, 144 (4th
Cir. 1966); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S.
896 (1959); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing
availability of privately negotiated transaction exemption under Williams Act).
"' Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977); Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing availability of privately
negotiated transaction exemption under Williams Act). This relationship may be "based on
factors such as employment, family, or economic bargaining power" that enable the offeree
"effectively to obtain" the information that a registration statement would provide. Doran
v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d at 903. The relationship may also rest upon a promise
from the offeror "to open appropriate files and records to the offeree as well as to answer
inquiries regarding material information." Id. at 904. If the offeror claims access to infor-
mation as a basis for the private offering exemption, "it must be shown that the offeree
could realistically have been expected to take advantage of his access to ascertain the relev-
ant information." Id. at 904-05.
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number of offerees, 92 number of units9 offered, manner of of-
fering, 94 and lack of common characteristics among the offerees. 95
Analogizing to the private offering exemption under the
1933 Act is an undesirable means of defining the privately
negotiated transaction exemption because the rationales underly-
ing each exemption differ.96 The Wellman court recognized that
the private offering case law "concerns matters not relevant to
considerations which would inform the boundaries separating a
tender offer from a privately negotiated transaction." 97 Con-
versely, defining the private solicitation exemption requires examin-
ing factors irrelevant to the private offering exemption. Among
these factors are congressional intent not to require prema-
ture disclosure of information that the transacting parties prefer
to keep secret, 98 Congress's concern about pressure on so-
licitees 99 and about nondiscriminatory treatment of tendering
9' Evidence of the number of offerees is impoitant in any invocation of the private
offering exemption "both in order to ascertain the magnitude of the offering and in order
to determine the characteristics and knowledge of the persons thus identified." Doran v.
Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977). See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475
F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing availability of privately negotiated transaction
exemption under Williams Act). However, quantity alone does not distinguish a private
from a public offering. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 121, 125 (1953) (500
offerees not necessarily too many); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d at 901;
Knapp v. Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797, 799, 893, 901 (6th Cir.) (issue of fact whether offering to
300 people is private or public), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958). Nonetheless, "the more
offerees, the more likely that the offering is public." Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp, 545
F.2d at 901 (quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688
(5th Cir. 1971)). See also H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2973, 2992 (exempted are "offering[s] to a limited number
of persons who presumably may be expected to possess some familiarity with the business
involved.... [N]o limit to the amount which ... may be offered, provided it is ... 'pri-
vately offered, which ... [SEC] construes [as] ... no more than ... 25 offerees."); H.R.
REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 (1973) ("sales of stock to stockholders ... subject to the Act unless the stockholders
are so small in number that the sale to them does not constitute a public offering.").
11 Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971).
9" Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977); Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing availability of privately
negotiated transaction exemption under Williams Act).
91 Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing availability
of privately negotiated transaction exemption under Williams Act).
9 See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 7, at 155 (private offering analogy inappropriate
because "very different public interests" underlay Williams Act and 1933 Act).
97 475 F. Supp. at 819.
'8 See id. at 820; notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
99 See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 819-21; notes 23-32 and accompanying
text supra.
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shareholders, 100 and the public interest in disclosure of imminent
changes in corporate control.101
The analogizing approach is also flawed because courts
should construe the Williams Act exemption more narrowly than
the 1933 Act exemption. First, the privately negotiated transaction
exception exempts solicitations not only from the Williams Act's
disclosure requirements, but also from its antifraud provisions.' 0 2
The exemption does not, however, free the offeror from the an-
tifraud prohibitions under the 1933 Act.' 0 3  Narrow construction
of the Williams Act exemption is thus necessary to prevent emas-
culation of the Act's antifraud provisions and to effectuate
broadly their remedial purposes." 4 Second, Congress explicitly
authorized the private offering exemption in the 1933 Act.' 0 5
Because the privately negotiated transaction exemption derives
from legislative history, courts should interpret it more narrowly.
III
PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING
"PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED TRANSACTION"
An adequate definition of the privately negotiated transaction
exemption must provide both certainty and flexibility and pro-
mote the purposes underlying the Williams Act. A vague defini-
tion may discourage economically beneficial private transactions
that should not be subject to the Williams Act's burdens, 10 6 or
may unfairly trap those earnestly seeking to comply with the law.
Flexibility 10 7 is necessary so that courts may treat alike factually
dissimilar transactions with identical impact on investors. These
100 See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
101 See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), (e) (1976).
103 Id. §§ 77d(2), 77e, 7 7 q.
104 Congress's intent that courts construe the Williams Act's antifraud provisions broadly
is implicit in the provisions' wide scope. Although the Act's disclosure requirements gener-
ally apply only to tender offers that might result in ownership of at least five percent of
the target company's outstanding securities, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), (d)(8)(A)-(C) (1976),
the antifraud prohibitions apply to all tender offers. Id. § 78n(e).
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
100 See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
107 The Supreme Court exhibits such flexibility in interpreting the private offering
exemption under the 1933 Act. See generally notes 84-95 and accompanying text supra. The
Court rejects a rigid numerical definition of the exemption: the "[1933 Act] would seem to
apply to a 'public offering' whether to few or many ... but there is no warrant for
superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings ... " SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (quoting SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.
1938)). Rather, "it is essential to examine the circumstances under which the distinction is
sought to be established .. " Id. at 124.
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requirements are satisfied by a judicial 08 test for privately
negotiated transactions consisting of threshold elements that each
exempt solicitation must display and a balancing of the offeror's,
shareholders', and public's interest in regulating transactions
meeting the threshold criteria.
A. Threshold Requirements
1. Availability of Information
A fundamental goal of the Williams Act is full disclosure to
solicitees of material information about imminent corporate con-
trol changes.'09 The privately negotiated transaction exemption
should therefore apply only if solicitees do not need pre-
solicitation disclosure. 10 Thus, an essential element of a private
10 An administrative "safe-harbor" rule should accompany this judicial definition of a
privately negotiated transaction. Cf. Note, Cash Tender Offers: A Proposed Definition, 31 U.
FLA. L. REv. 694, 715-18 (1979) (proposing administrative definition of tender offers be-
cause courts "ill-suited for the task of comprehensively defining the term"). Although the
proposed judicial definition affords greater certainty to prospective offerors than some
current tests, see, e.g., notes 76, 77 supra, absolute certainty is possible only through a rigid
administrative rule. However, because rigid definitions cannot account for all possible fact
patterns, see notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra, the safe-harbor rule should be
nonexclusive. Offerors should be exempt from the Williams Act if they comply with either
the explicit requirements of the rule, or with the more flexible judicial interpretations of
the exemption. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976) (SEC nonexclusive safe-harbor interpreta-
tion of private offering exemption under 1933 Act). The rule should consist of objective
criteria, such as number of solicitees and premium price, that would provide prospective
offerors with clear guidelines.
Although the SEC long refused to define tender offer because the "dynamic nature"
of tender offers required administrative and judicial flexibility, Securities Exchange Act
Rel. No. 34-12676, 41 Fed. Reg. 33004, 33005 (1976), the SEC recently proposed a "safe
harbor" definition of tender offer. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-16385, 44 Fed.
Reg. 70,349, 70,358 (1979). The definition makes a solicitation falling into either of two
categories a tender offer. A tender offer under the first category consists of "one or more
offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to sell securities of a single class;" the offers
must extend to more than ten persons during any 45 day period and seek more than five
percent of the class of securities. Id.; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976) (pre-solicitation disclo-
sure required if tender offer would result in ownership of more than five percent of class of
securities solicited). Offers made by a broker or dealer, on a national exchange or over-
the-counter, and at the current market price are not tender offers provided: (a) the of-
feror, broker or dealer neither solicits offers to sell, nor arranges such solicitations; and (b)
the broker or dealer receives no more than the customary commission or mark-up. Id. A
solicitation falls in the second, vaguer category of tender offer if "one or more offers to
purchase or solicitations of offers to sell securities of a single class" are "disseminated in a
widespread manner," offer a premium of at least the greater of two dollars or five percent
of the current market price, and "do not provide for a meaningful opportunity to
negotiate the price and terms." Id.
"' See notes 23-30 and accompanying text supra.
110 Cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (availability of private offer-
ing exemption under 1933 Act based on "whether the [offeree] ... needs the protection of
the Act.").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:361
solicitation is the availability to offerees of the same information
that the Act requires from tender offerors.
Information is "available" either if the offeror actually dis-
closes it to the offeree, or if the offeree has access I I to the in-
formation and can compel its disclosure. 1 2  Such access may rest
on economic bargaining power, or an insider position with the
offeror. Where economic bargaining power is the basis of access,
courts should limit the exemption to solicitations of such a small
number of substantial shareholders that each is important to the
offeror's success and thus able to compel disclosure.1 3
2. Sophistication of Solicitees
Information is worthless if the solicitee cannot evaluate it."14
Each solicitee in a privately negotiated transaction must therefore
be sophisticated enough to evaluate the information to which he
has access or which the offeror actually discloses. Courts should
presume that professional and institutional investors have such
sophistication, 1 5 but should carefully examine the sophistication
of individual, non-professional investors.' 16
l"I Either access to information or actual disclosure suffices for the private offering
exemption under the 1933 Act. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903-08
(5th Cir. 1977). See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
112 Cf. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904-05, 905 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977)
(access standard under private offering exemption from 1933 Act satisfied only if offeree
able to compel disclosure).
I" Cf. id. at 905 n.12 (access standard for private offering exemption under 1933 Act
requiring ability to compel disclosure, which may rest on economic bargaining power).
14 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
112 See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP
(CCH) 97,107, at 96,149 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (presuming financial institutions, bank trusts
and other institutional investors to be sophisticated) (dicta); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc.
v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,422, 93,429
(D.D.C. 1978) (bank one of several "sophisticated investors").
I6 Courts should not assume that holders of substantial amounts of the target company's
securities are sophisticated. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475- F. Supp. 783, 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (solicitees who acquired substantial amount of target company shares after target
took over business in which solicitees were principals not sophisticated investors). Cf.
Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,107, at 96,149 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (in solicitation to Hoover family members collectively
owning 41% of target stock, member of controlling family not necessarily sophisticated)
(dicta). But see Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,420, 93,429 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding substantial shareholders of
target company stock, controlling shareholder of an investment banking firm, and attorney
holding 20,000 shares of target "sophisticated investors"); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(substantial shareholders "may be presumed to be powerful enough not to be pressured
into making uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell").
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3. Absence of Pressure on Solicitees
The third essential element of a privately negotiated transac-
tion should be the absence of excessive pressure on solicitees to
make ill-considered decisions to tender. 1 7  Sophistication and in-
formation hardly benefit an offeree unless he has the opportunity
to analyze the information thoroughly. Pressure may arise from
short time periods in which to tender coupled with a premium
price,11 8 or with widespread publicity through press releases, let-
ters, or telephone calls.119
Although they should analyze the facts of each transaction,
courts may reasonably assume that large institutional investors
and corporate insiders will be less susceptible to pressure than
small, outside investors. 120 Because of their greater resources
and expertise, institutional investors will generally require less
time to deal intelligently with available information than even a
small, sophisticated investor. 12 1  Courts may also presume that
transactions consummated according to the offeree's terms are not
subject to excessive pressure. 122
B. Balancing Interests in Regulating a Transaction
A solicitation to a few shareholders that meets the three
threshold criteria and in which solicitees have access I" to material
11"7 See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,107, at 96,150 (N.D. Ohio 199) ("Congress's basic purpose in enacting the
Williams Act was to take the pressure off investors who were forced to make rapid, unin-
formed decisions in tender offer situations."); notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
11s A premium price alone-without threats that the offer will terminate if the offeree
does not tender promptly-should not establish excessive pressure. Cf. Financial Gen.
Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403, at
93,429 (D.D.C. 1978) (premium price alone insufficient for tender offer).
119 See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,107, at 96,146-47 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
120 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ("directors [of target company and] ... substan-
tial shareholders ... may be presumed to be powerful enough not to be pressured ... into
making uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell.").
121 A period of 10 days within which to tender should suffice for any solicitee. See 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976) (10 day right to withdraw tendered shares).
122 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. Il1. 1973). Courts finding excessive pressure should pre-
sume that the transaction is a tender offer. Cf. Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,150 (N.D. Ohio 1979) ("If
an offer [is] otherwise far removed from a conventional tender offer, a court might still
find a tender offer if the shareholders were pressured.").
123 See notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra.
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information should be exempt from the Williams Act without
further analysis. However, an offer to a large group that meets
the threshold requirements and in which information is available
only through actual disclosure by the offeror should not always
merit the privately negotiated transaction exemption. 124  Courts
should classify such solicitations only after weighing the solicitees'
needs for the Act's fairness provisions 125 and the public investors'
needs for advance disclosure 126 against the offeror's and
economy's interests in exempting the transaction from the Act's
burdens.127
Several considerations should guide a court when balancing
these interests. First, if all solicitees receive identical terms, ad-
vance disclosure of the terms offered to one party will likely not
hinder the offeror's negotiations with other offerees 1 28  Second,
if the offeror structures a transaction as a "lightning takeover," in-
tending to acquire a controlling interest in a few days, he has little
interest in keeping the acquisition secret from his competitors. 2 :
Offerors in privately negotiated transactions must disclose infor-
mation similar to that required of tender offerors within ten days
after the acquisition. 130  Third, publicity surrounding an offer
also minimizes an offeror's interest in keeping a transaction secret
in order to prevent disruption or delicate negotiations; 131 public-
124 Three reasons support distinguishing a solicitation to a half-dozen or so substantial
investors with access to information from a solicitation to a larger number of investors in
which information is available only through actual disclosure. First, although neither group
needs the protection of the Williams Act's disclosure provisions, the need for the Act's
fairness provisions is probably greater in the second solicitation. The second group's lack of
access to information and inability to obtain its disclosure suggests a corresponding inability
to obtain equitable terms. Solicitees in the larger group will likely be less able to bargain for
equitable terms because each is less important to the success of the solicitation. Second,
statements made during the congressional hearings on the Williams Act imply that the
offerees in a privately negotiated transaction would be a few substantial shareholders. See
S. Hearings, supra note 3, at 36 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen) (Williams
Act inapplicable to "privately negotiated purchases from substantial shareholders"); id. at
133 (statement of Prof. Stanley A. Kaplan) (Williams Act inapplicable "where the new in-
terest buys working control or majority control from the present holder of such control").
Third, corporations closely held by few shareholders tend to be small; thus, the economic
impact of unregulated changes in corporate control is less than in acquisitions involving
large corporations owned by many shareholders.
125 See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
126 See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
127 See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
128 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
129 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
130 See note 30 supra.
131 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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ity itself disrupts such negotiations. 3 Fourth, the privately
negotiated transaction exemption should be unavailable if the
transacting parties have no mutual desire to keep an acquisition
secret,133 but the offeror alone wants secrecy in order to mask a
takeover attempt.134 Fifth, because solicitees unable to compel dis-
closure of material information are probably also unable to com-
pel equitable terms,'13 5 courts should scrutinize closely the substan-
tive and procedural fairness accorded each offeree. Sixth, the
public interest in advance disclosure 136 of an offeror's plans for
the target company may be low if the target corporation is small
or closely held. Few public investors may be interested in disclo-
sure, 37 and the cost of complying with the Williams Act may far
outweigh the benefits.
CONCLUSION
Current definitions of "tender offer" and "privately
negotiated transaction" are inadequate. Courts should recognize
that the interests of offerees demand that "privately negotiated
transactions" have three essential characteristics: availability of
material information through access or disclosure, sophistication
of solicitees, and absence of excessive pressure to tender. If a so-
licitation meets these requirements and if information is available
only through actual disclosure, courts should weigh the competing
interests in regulating the solicitation. This definition of the pri-
vately negotiated transaction exemption would enable courts to
both promote the purposes underlying the Williams Act and pro-
vide prospective offerors with reasonably certain guidelines.
Gary E. Humes
132 See note 76 supra.
133 See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 820 ("[Tlhese were undoubtedly not 'pri-
vately negotiated transactions' in which there was a mutual desire to avoid premature dis-
closure.").
134 See id. at 823 ("acquisition ... infected with ... basic evil which Congress sought to
cure [through Williams Act:] ... intent ... to effectuate a transfer ... in a swift, masked
maneuver").
135 See note 124 supra.
136 See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
'a If a target corporation is small, and its securities are not widely and publicly traded,
a court should focus on the size of unsolicited holdings because the interest of non-share-
holding public investors will be minimal. The reasons for characterizing a transaction as a
tender offer become more compelling as the number of unsolicited and uninformed
shareholders increases. See notes 39-43 and accompaning text supra.
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